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Abstract
The interaction between housing wealth, the ￿nancial portfolio of the consumer and
consumption is a live issue. Life cycle models with closed form solutions under uncertainty
are hard to ￿nd. In this paper we ￿nd analytical solutions for the e⁄ects of house price
uncertainty and employment risk on consumption, savings and mortgage ￿nance in a ￿nite
horizon life-cycle model. In each period the consumer decides whether to withdraw equity
from the house or not, subject to a transaction cost and a constraint on the maximum
mortgage loan to value ratio. Despite risk aversion we ￿nd that, if borrowing is allowed
in the ￿nancial asset, the prime portfolio e⁄ect is the spread between the interest rate
and the mortgage rate. House price uncertainty has an ambiguous e⁄ect on consumption,
which depends on the interest rate di⁄erential and house price expectations since future
house prices a⁄ect future remortgage possibilities. If unsecured debt is not possible, we ￿nd
that the possibility of future liquidity constraints can reduce mortgage borrowing below the
maximum possible.
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11 Introduction
Housing is one of the major spending and ￿nancial decisions facing consumers. In the UK the
owner occupation rate is 70%1 and housing is one of the few spending decisions that has a
speci￿c asset to assist its ￿nancing: the mortgage. In addition, for the majority of consumers
wealth largely consists of housing and pension wealth. Since the latter is usually untouchable,
the ￿ exible part of wealth is primarily housing equity. Thus, our key argument is that most
cash-convertible wealth increases are in housing wealth - pension wealth is not realisable and
most households have quite negligible average values of ￿nancial assets. In the context of a life
cycle model the realisation of wealth accruals is driven by the desire to smooth consumption.
However, since consumers need somewhere to live, increases in housing wealth can only be
realised to a limited extent, mainly in three ways: either by trading down house quality, by
moving into rented accommodation or by remortgaging. In this paper we focus on the last one.
Our view is reinforced by the policy concern over the importance of housing equity withdrawal
as a means of ￿nancing consumption sprees, which may then lead to lack of macroeconomic
control of the economy. Of course the reverse side of the coin is the prospect of falls in
house prices and, thus, in housing wealth, in which case housing debt can lead to consumers
being locked into negative equity. Therefore, housing wealth and equity are major drivers of
consumption. Figure 1 shows that in the 1990s housing borrowing secured against housing
had risen by a substantially larger amount than that needed to fund new housing investment.
This trend has reversed in 2008 when, due to the ￿nancial crisis, housing equity withdrawal
has become negative for the ￿rst time in the last three decades, partly due to the fall in high
loan-to-value new borrowing.
To analyse the e⁄ects of house price uncertainty and mortgage equity withdrawal on con-
sumption, we use a real model with a time additive utility over a ￿nite horizon and a positive
rate of time preference. The individual has a portfolio composed of two ￿nancial assets: a
mortgage and a riskless asset. The mortgage is an adjustable rate loan that is taken for the
remaining life of the consumer but can be increased at any date. In the mortgage market there
are two imperfections: re￿nancing the mortgage involves the payment of a ￿xed transaction
cost and the new loan can never exceed the latest realised house price. In the last period of the
life the house is sold and any outstanding debt must be paid o⁄. In the model we include both
1Source: Eurostat SILC 2009.
2Figure 1: Housing equity withdrawal 1980-2011. Source: Bank of England.
employment and real house price risk, while wages and real interest rates are time varying and
driven by stochastic processes, but they are foreseen by the individual
The new features of our framework (which in some respects is very stylised) are:
￿ We explicitly model housing equity withdrawal through remortgaging as house prices
change in an environment in which decisions are taken under house price uncertainty and
employment risk.
￿ There is no approximation in our approach; some variables are perfectly foreseen by the
decision maker but others, such as house prices and employment status, are not, and
despite this we derive a closed form analytical solution for optimal equity withdrawal and
consumption.
￿ The result is a consumption function in which the current and random values of future
house prices play a critical role. On the one hand, uncertain future house prices give the
opportunity of high prices and so the chance of high future equity withdrawal, reducing
the need for current bu⁄er stock savings against future employment uncertainty. On
the other hand, there is a risk that future house prices might be low, constraining the
re￿nancing possibilities, which serves to depress current consumption. Which of these two
e⁄ects dominate depends on the interest rate di⁄erential and house price expectations.
￿ We also ￿nd a ￿nancial portfolio decision important in ￿nancing consumption. If we
3have a recontractible one period mortgage and a one period bond, then with no saving
or borrowing constraints in the bond, there is an issue of whether the consumer should
￿nance consumption from bond borrowing or from remortgaging when housing wealth
increases. We show that, despite any degree of risk aversion, with the preferences that we
use, consumers will choose the cheapest ￿nancial source to ￿nance consumption smoothing
as housing wealth rises. The picture is more complicated in the presence of binding
liquidity constraints. We show that in this case re￿nancing is possible even when the
mortgage rate is relatively high. This result is consistent with a stream of the literature
(Hurst and Sta⁄ord, 2004; Smith and Vass, 2004) that shows that the extent to which
investors do re￿nance depends on the amount of liquid assets they hold.
￿ There are special end of life e⁄ects. Consumers cannot die in debt so any outstanding
mortgage must be paid o⁄ by current realisable wealth. But there is a cleft stick: in the
￿nal period of life, house prices might jump to high levels leading to large unanticipated
wealth increases, or they could fall leading to the need to ￿nd some ￿nancial way of
paying o⁄ any existing mortgage debt outside of the value of the house.
The plan of the paper is to review the literature in section 2, give the assumptions in section
3 and derive the overall value function explicitly in sections 4. In section 5 we analytically derive
the consumption function. In section 6 we present the case with liquidity constraints. We then
brie￿ y discuss extensions and conclude.
2 Literature Review
Housing impacts on individuals in various ways. One strand of the literature focuses on the role
of housing on portfolio decisions. Some economies have a liquid rental market for housing and an
illiquid retail market; others have a negligible rental market outside metropolitan areas but an
active retail market (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2001). Flavin and Yamashita (2003) stress that with
a thin rental market housing decisions have to balance ￿nancial asset portfolio considerations
with the need for housing services. In the UK about 43% of homeowners bought their house
outright without a mortgage and home equity accounts for about 60% of personal wealth (Banks
et al., 2003). Thus owner occupiers face the risk of random house prices - both nominal and
real. Several authors have argued that this risk explains why consumers do not invest in equities
4but in relatively safe assets: their overall portfolio including housing has the right balance of
risk and return without investing in equities (Pelizzon and Weber, 2008). On the other hand,
57% of house buyers do have a mortgage and for them there are additional risks: the liquidity
risk that with a bad income shock it would be di¢ cult to maintain repayments (Fratantoni,
2001) and the risk that the mortgage interest rate might change. In addition, they have to
make other decisions: when to repay the mortgage or, in common with the ￿rst group who
have no mortgage, when to withdraw equity from the house. Furthermore, both of these groups
face common shocks, such as wage and employment risk. The importance of these di⁄erent
risks varies over the life cycle; usually for highly geared young households, with housing debt a
high proportion of wealth and income (Cocco, 2005), the liquidity risk is higher than for older
households with, on average, more diversi￿ed wealth and more house equity. This implies that
the typical life cycle portfolio composition sees systematic changes in the share of housing in
wealth.
There is also a recent literature that looks at the collateral/bu⁄er stock e⁄ect of housing
investment on precautionary savings. The argument is that, although the retail housing market
is illiquid, housing equity serves as a bu⁄er stock of wealth against low probability but very
negative income shocks. Thus, even if housing is rarely traded because of the high transaction
costs, it allows a higher level of mean consumption since if the worst income events occur there
is a bu⁄er stock of wealth that can be realised. And, if trend real houses prices are growing then
housing wealth is rising which may allow households to cut back ￿nancial asset saving (Berry
et al., 2009). Benito (2009) ￿nds that housing equity acts as a bu⁄er stock against bad shocks,
e.g. in employment in the UK. However the bu⁄er role of housing wealth must be o⁄set against
the fact that most homeowners hold mortgage debt against their housing (Campbell and Cocco,
2003), so that net housing wealth may be quite low, and also the fact that consumers need a
roof over their head, so that they might not be able to sell the house where they live and, even
if they can, they have to buy or rent another one. In the presence of high transaction costs
in housing and a thin rental market, consumers can withdraw equity from their properties by
using the bu⁄er stock of housing wealth. This is predominantly executed by remortgaging.
However, mortgage markets are imperfect in that there are costs in altering the debt position
and limits on the amount that can be borrowed in a mortgage. This means that there may be
inertia in the re￿nancing decision. For example, in the US, where most mortgages are at ￿xed
nominal interest rates, there is active re￿nancing as interest rates change (Majumdar, 2004),
5but in Europe this is less common (Smith and Vass, 2004). Even in the US there is evidence
of suboptimal timing e⁄ects (Agarwal et al., 2009; Campbell, 2006).
Housing wealth interacts with unsecured borrowing. In itself housing wealth provides col-
lateral against loans for non-housing purposes. Unsecured borrowing constraints may lead to
equity withdrawal to ￿nance consumption (Benito & Mumtaz, 2009), although the ￿ ip side of
this is that negative home equity may lead to unsecured borrowing (Iacoviello, 2004). Disney
et al. (2010) ￿nd some evidence of both in the UK.
Another issue in the literature is related to the degree of substitutability of housing and
￿nancial wealth in determining consumption. Will two households with the same aggregate
wealth, the same labour income prospects and the same preferences follow the same consump-
tion function if one of them has a much higher proportion of housing wealth than the other?
The empirical results here are mixed (Hoynes and McFadden, 1996; Bostic et al. 2009; Majum-
dar, 2004). Similarly Attanasio et al. (2009) and Browning et al (2010) do not ￿nd e⁄ects on
consumption of housing as a special form of wealth although there is some evidence of its role
as a source of collateral. The question is important since consumer spending ￿ uctuations are
often seen as an important determinant of business cycle ￿ uctuations. The main transmission
mechanism for converting changes in housing wealth into disposable resources is the mortgage;
therefore, analysing how mortgage decisions are made is crucial. The paper of Campbell and
Cocco (2003) is a related major study of the relative advantages of ￿xed and variable rate
mortgages that is close to our concerns. Li and Yao (2007) also study the e⁄ects of house price
changes on household consumption. However, their analysis substantially di⁄ers from ours
in that all mortgage re￿nances in their model are for consumption purposes only and are not
driven by ￿nancial e¢ ciency considerations; this arises from the assumption that the unsecured
and secured borrowing rate are set to be equal. Remortgaging and equity withdrawal is one
of the main ways in which housing wealth can ￿nance other household choices. Some empir-
ical work reinforces our theoretical results: Canner et al. (2002), Schwarz et al. (2008) and
Ebner (2010) ￿nd that ￿nancial e¢ ciency factors are important in determining remortgaging
and Agarwal et al. (2006) and Campbell (2006) also give these factors a major role.
With its complex features, modelling these housing choices is not straightforward. Quite
special assumptions are necessary to derive analytical conclusions; for example Ortalo-MagnØ
and Rady (2006) use utility linear in consumption, a ￿xed utility premium for a large house
over a smaller one and no uncertainty and derive analytical results about the nature of general
6equilibrium house prices. Campbell and Cocco (2003), Cocco (2005), Li and Yao (2007) and
Yang (2009) rely on calibrated numerical simulation involving grid search over both their state
and control variables to derive the optimum. This approach allows the use of more general
assumptions about the stochastic processes that drive house prices, interest rates and labour
income but does not yield analytical conclusions.
3 The Model Assumptions
We consider a ￿nite horizon T of discrete time periods t. Within a period t < T the timing of
the model is as follows. At the start of the period the individual has a portfolio composed of
two ￿nancial assets: a riskless asset At with rate of return rt and a mortgage Mt that allows
the investor to borrow against the value of the house at a rate ￿t. We assume that both rt
and ￿t are perfectly foreseen and that a mortgage loan initiated at t matures at T. In each
period, consumers decide whether to re￿nance or not. When re￿nancing occurs, they redeem
the existing debt, pay a transaction cost k and choose a new mortgage size Mt+1, which cannot
exceed a fraction ￿ of the latest realised price pt. The loan to value ratio (LTV) is a key statistic
used by lenders and regulators in the UK. For example the Financial Services Authority reports
that in 2010 more than 70% of new mortgages had LTV below 75% and less than 2% had LTV
above 90%. House prices are stationary with a deterministic trend. Then, consumption ct is
chosen and next the individual receives labour income ws
t: if the individual has a job, this is the
wage wt, if she is unemployed, it is bene￿ts Bt: Each period there is a constant probability a of
being unemployed and wages and bene￿ts are time dependent but perfectly foreseen. Finally,
the stock of ￿nancial assets At+1 to carry forward into the next period is determined. This
means that assets bear all the e⁄ects of shocks in employment, but this only a⁄ects the current
period and is insigni￿cant over the lifetime2. Note also that as viewed from earlier periods Mt+1
is random, since it depends on the realisation of random house prices through the constraint
Mt+1 ￿ ￿pt:
The general form of the budget constraint in any period before the ￿nal one is
At+1 = (1 + rt)At + ws
t + Mt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt ￿ k ￿ ct
2This is unimportant and arises from the de￿nition of the period, but the use of this timing simpli￿es the
analysis. You may think of shopping on Saturday and being paid the subsequent Friday.
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Figure 2: Timing
If there is no re￿nancing Mt+1 = Mt and no transaction cost has to be paid (k = 0):
At+1 = (1 + rt)At + ws
t ￿ ￿tMt ￿ ct
The consumer enters the ￿nal period with mortgage debt MT; ￿nancial assets AT and with a
realised house price of pT. At the period start the individual sells the house (but arranges to
continue living in it for the duration of the period3), redeems any outstanding mortgage and
consumes all the known cash on hand.
cT = (1 + rt)AT + pT + ws
T ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT ￿ k
We also assume that in the last period for sure the individual is unemployed (but we could
also think of this as retirement) so that ws
T = BT: This is without loss of generality since
consumption is determined prior to knowledge of employment status and then in the last
period it would have to be reined back to a level that will prove feasible if it turns out that the
individual is unemployed, as it is impossible to die in debt.
Lifetime preferences are additive and there is a positive intertemporal discount rate ￿:4
U0 = ￿￿tu(ct)
3There is a small market in which equity in the house can be realised in the last years of life eg by selling
the house to a ￿nancial institution and buying back an option to live in it until death but this is not very well
developed.
4It would be very simple to add a bequest motive, especially if the utility of bequests also has an exponential
form.
8The per-period utility function has a CARA form and depends only on consumption:
u(ct) = 1 ￿ exp(￿bct)
where b is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. That is, there is a zero utility of housing and
an inelastic labour supply. Since we assume that the individual keeps the house throughout
her life, then omitting it from the value function is without loss of generality. Ignoring the
disutility of work is more serious and is based on simplicity; we could include it assuming that
jobs have ￿xed hours of work. Similarly, we could incorporate socio-demographic variables,
such as the number of children into the analysis. CARA preferences have the advantage of
exhibiting prudence and allowing us to derive exact solutions without having to approximate
Euler equations. Much of the literature works with isoelastic felicity, which generally requires
approximation to get solutions. On the one hand, there is some evidence (Gourinchas and
Parker, 2002) that the approximation error involved can be substantial; on the other hand,
since isoelastic preferences have unbounded marginal utility at zero consumption, they generally
serve to keep cash on hand positive and, therefore, almost act like a liquidity constraint. With
CARA, marginal utility is ￿nite at zero consumption, so we may expect to see the consumer
actively borrowing. However, the lifetime budget constraint prevents her dying in debt.




￿t [1 ￿ exp(￿bct)]
subject to
At+1 = (1 + rt)At + ws
t + Mt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt ￿ k ￿ ct Mt+1 > Mt; t < T
At+1 = (1 + rt)At + ws
t ￿ ￿tMt ￿ k ￿ ct Mt+1 = Mt; t < T
cT = (1 + rt)AT + pT + BT ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT ￿ k
Mt ￿ Mt+1 ￿ ￿pt
The interesting empirical questions about mortgage re￿nance concern equity withdrawal
and portfolio diversi￿cation among housing assets, mortgage debt and net ￿nancial assets.
There are two reasons primarily for mortgage re￿nancing. The ￿rst motivation is that bank
borrowing might get very cheap relative to mortgage debt in which case the consumer may
wish to switch from secured to unsecured debt so far as this is allowed. The second reason for
9re￿nancing is that as house prices and, thus, wealth rise, the individual may want to withdraw
equity from the house by increasing the mortgage. To focus on the latter we impose the
constraint that Mt ￿ Mt+1 and assume that the individual starts life with a given mortgage
M1: Our argument is that consumers will only wish to reduce their mortgage debt if there is
an unanticipated income gain large enough so that consumption smoothing bene￿ts overcome
the transaction cost that has to be paid to reduce the mortgage. In practice in the reality this
does not happen - it is con￿ned to a tiny proportion of the population who receive large lump
sum income gains, e.g. winning the national lottery or large bequests from wealthy relatives.
Hence, we argue that the constraint Mt ￿ Mt+1 ￿ ￿pt captures the essence of housing equity
withdrawal combined with lender limits on the extent to which this is possible.
4 Value Function
In any period t < T the value function is the maximum of the value function with re￿nancing







Based on Merton (1992), and Berlo⁄a and Simmons (2003), we conjecture that Vt takes the
form:
Vt(At;Mt;pt) = ￿t ￿ ￿t expf￿b￿t [(1 + rt)At ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt]g (1)
The ￿rst main result of our paper is to derive this form and the functions ￿;￿;￿. In fact, ￿ will
prove to be a discounting function depending on the rate of time preference and ￿ a discounting
function depending on interest rates. The most interesting function is ￿, which depends on the
expectation of future house prices and employment states and on the future optimal mortgage
and saving decisions.
In periods before the ￿nal one (in which re￿nancing does not occur) the form of the value
function depends on whether it is optimal to undertake re￿nancing. We derive the value
functions at t with and without re￿nancing and then compare them to determine the optimal
re￿nancing decision.
The appendix shows that conditional on the re￿nancing decision, the value function with
10re￿nancing is
V R
t (At) = 1 + ￿￿t+1 ￿ [￿(E￿t+1)￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)]1=[1+￿t+1(1+rt+1)]
￿expf￿b￿t[(1 + rt)At ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt]gWt
￿exp
￿




Wt = faexp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)wt] + (1 ￿ a)exp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt]g
1=[1+￿t+1(1+rt+1)]
is the expected utility term corresponding to next periods labour income and:
￿t =
￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)
1 + ￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)
is the "discounted future interest rate".
At the start of t; given that remortgaging takes place, the mortgage re￿nancing decision
is to choose Mt+1 to maximise V R
t (At) within the constraint Mt ￿ Mt+1 ￿ ￿pt. De￿ning




=(1 + rt+1), this is equivalent to minimising:
exp(￿b￿tMt+1￿t+1)
The decision rule is then:
Mt+1 = ￿pt if ￿t+1 > 0
Mt+1 = Mt if ￿t+1 < 0
Therefore, re￿nancing occurs only when ￿t > 0 (i.e.rt+1 > ￿t+1) and the individual chooses
maximum equity withdrawal. Integrating this into the value function
V R
t (At) = 1 + ￿￿t+1 ￿ [￿(E￿t+1)￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)]1=[1+￿t+1(1+rt+1)] ￿





















11Similar arguments show that without re￿nancing
V NR
t (At) = 1 + ￿￿t+1 ￿ [￿(E￿t+1)￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)]1=[1+￿t+1(1+rt+1)]
￿expf￿b￿t[(1 + rt)At ￿ Mt]g ￿ exp(￿b￿t￿t+1Mt) ￿ Wt=￿t
By comparing the two value functions we obtain the condition under which re￿nancing occurs.
At t the individual chooses to re￿nance the mortgage if V R
t (At) > V NR
t (At).
If ￿t+1 > 0 (the mortgage rate is lower than the interest rate) then re￿nancing occurs when
￿pt ￿ Mt >
k
￿t+1
In terms of the debt service costs it pays to re￿nance to the highest extent possible by setting
Mt+1 = pt so long as the interest gain on the sum involved more than covers the transaction
cost of re￿nancing.
On the other hand, if ￿t+1 < 0 (the mortgage rate is higher than the interest rate), no
re￿nancing occurs.
We can summarise the possible remortgage actions at time t (assuming that at some past
point t ￿ s a maximum mortgage had been taken) as
￿t+1 > 0 Mt = ￿pt￿s ￿t+1￿pt > ￿t+1￿pt￿s + k Mt+1 = ￿pt
￿t+1￿pt < ￿t+1￿pt￿s + k Mt+1 = ￿pt￿s
￿t+1 < 0 Mt = ￿pt￿s ￿t+1￿pt￿s + k > 0 Mt+1 = ￿pt￿s
Table 1: Possible remortgage actions
4.1 Overall Value Function
The overall value function is the larger of V R
t (At;Mt) and V NR
t (At;Mt), which gives us the
result
Proposition 1 The value function has the form5
Vt(At;Mt;pt) = ￿t ￿ ￿t expf￿b￿t [(1 + rt)At ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt]g
5In fact the value function has this same form (with a di⁄erent de￿nition of ￿) if ￿ is stochastic and k is time
varying or stochastic as long as the current period mortgage rate and transaction cost are realised prior to the
current re￿nancing decision.
12where ￿t;￿t;￿t are de￿ned recursively through
￿t = 1 + ￿￿t+1 (2)
￿t = ￿t =
￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)































The recurrence relation in ￿, which captures the e⁄ect of future house prices and employ-
ment uncertainty, requires some careful analysis.
4.2 E￿t+1 : The E⁄ects of Future House Price Uncertainty
Future house prices (pt+2;pt+3::) and the current remortage decision Mt+1 determine the op-
portunities and desirability of future re￿nancing. It is through this channel that house price
uncertainty impacts on current decisions. In our model, the e⁄ects of future house price un-
certainty at time t work through the expression Et￿t+1: However, since the mortgage is only
binding for a single period (next period there is another re￿nancing point) and we have assumed
that any trend in pt is not stochastic, it is only immediate future house prices that impact on
the Mt+1 decision. Therefore, Et+1￿t+2 is not a function of pt+1 and at time t the random















Gt+1 = 0 if ￿t+2 < 0
= ￿t+2Mt+1 if ￿t+2 > 0 and ￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k < ￿t+2Mt+1 (6)
= ￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k if ￿t+2 > 0 and ￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k > ￿t+2Mt+1 (7)
We want to compute EtFt+1 over pt+1:
If ￿t+2 < 0; the consumer does not wish to re￿nance. In this case Gt+1 is not random, so
EtFt+1 = Ft+1:
If ￿t+2 > 0 it is more complex. The second case (6) holds when house prices are such
that the consumer potentially wishes to re￿nance to the maximum permissible extent but the
savings from doing so will not cover the transaction cost of re￿nance. This occurs when
￿pt+1 < Mt+1 +
k
￿t+2
On the contrary, in the third case (7), which holds for pt+1 above this critical value, the gains
from taking out a new maximum mortgage do cover the transaction cost. Hence when ￿t+1 > 0,
if we de￿ne the probability that the maximum remortgage will not cover the transaction cost
by ￿t = Pr(￿pt+1 < Mt+1 + k
￿t+2), the expression for EtFt+1 becomes:
EtFt+1 = Et
￿
exp[￿b￿t+1 (￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k)]
￿ ￿
















> ￿pt+1 then ￿t = 1
Therefore, we have two boundary cases where either house prices are always so low that a
maximum equity withdrawal will not cover the transaction cost or they are so high that with









the nature of Et￿t+1 follows. Thus, there are only e⁄ects of immediate future house price
uncertainty on the current value function if ￿t+2 > 0 In fact, extending this argument, the
distribution of house prices at any future date ￿ only a⁄ects the current value function for
those periods in which ￿￿+1 > 0. Appendix A.2 shows that6:























Note that there is an e⁄ect on ￿t of the time to go to the horizon: the longer the remaining
future, the higher the number of terms in the product for ￿ since there are more future nodes.
Therefore, in earlier periods ￿ tends to be higher, which re￿ ects the e⁄ect of the greater
amount of uncertainty remaining. Conversely, towards the end of life there is little remaining
uncertainty and so on these grounds less of a need for precautionary savings.
6 If the probability of unemployment was either history dependent or uncertain, then so long as it is inde-















































































































































































































From the relevant ￿rst order conditions for consumption we can derive the consumption function
and examine its properties.



























This expression subsumes two cases: when ￿t+1 > 0 and ￿pt￿t+1￿k > Mt￿t+1 the individual
chooses to re￿nance at t, whereas when ￿t+1 > 0 and ￿pt￿t+1 ￿ k < Mt￿t+1 or ￿t+1 < 0
optimally there is no re￿nance. The main features of the consumption function are summarised
by proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Uncertainty of future house prices may raise or lower current consumption. If
(a) ￿t+2 > 0 and ￿p
t+1￿t+2 ￿ k > Mt+1￿t+2 optimal consumption under uncertain house
prices is lower than with house price certainty.
(b) ￿t+2 > 0 and ￿Etpt+1￿t+2 ￿ k > Mt+1￿t+2 uncertainty in house prices may raise or
lower consumption depending on the nature of the house price distribution, the interest rates
and the degree of risk aversion
(c) ￿t+2 > 0 and ￿Etpt+1￿t+2 ￿k < Mt+1￿t+2 optimal consumption under uncertain house
prices is higher than with house price certainty and precautionary savings are negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
Both with and without re￿nancing the e⁄ect of future period employment risk and house
price uncertainty is to shift the intercept of the consumption function by an amount that de-




< 1 ￿ ￿t, the future
uncertainty in house prices may actually increase rather than reduce consumption. Uncertain
future house prices give the opportunity of high prices and so the chance of high future eq-
uity withdrawal, reducing the need for current bu⁄er stock savings against future employment
uncertainty. If future house prices are certain, then the expression for Et￿t+1 changes when
￿t+2 > 0: We can gauge the e⁄ect of this by comparing Et￿t+1 with its value when house prices
in the next period are constant at their mean Etpt+1. In (a) with both certain and uncertain
17house prices the consumer has the same expected re￿nancing possibilities; this is the standard
case in which uncertainty lowers current consumption unambiguously and precautionary sav-
ings are positive. In (b) on the one hand there is a risk that future house prices might be low,
constraining the re￿nancing possibilities, which serves to depress current consumption; on the
other hand, house prices might be high, giving the opportunity of future equity withdrawal,
higher than with certain house prices. The overall e⁄ect is ambiguous and depends on future
house price expectations. The ambiguity exists even though we do not have any stochastic
trend in house prices. If we had, this result would be even stronger. Finally in (c), when with
certain future house prices no re￿nancing is undertaken (￿Etpt+1￿t+1￿k < Mt+1￿t+1), precau-
tionary savings are negative and house price uncertainty serves to raise current consumption.
The intuition is that in this case house price risk is just upside risk.
Summing up, in each of these cases (a)-(c) housing is acting like an intertemporal bu⁄er
stock of wealth with e⁄ects on the current level of savings. Knowing that in the future there
will be a redeemable asset (though of uncertain value), the consumer can a⁄ord to borrow
today. In addition, the composition of wealth between net housing wealth (pt￿Mt) and At has
an impact on consumption. The marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is ￿t (1 + rt)
but out of a reduction of the current mortgage is ￿t(1 ￿ ￿t+1):
Moreover, there is an e⁄ect on consumption of the remaining length of the horizon. We
have seen that Et￿1￿t tends to fall through time and this serves to yield consumption growth
through time ceteris paribus. As time passes there is less remaining uncertainty and thus less
of a need for precautionary savings.
Proposition 4 Labour income uncertainty depresses consumption and raises savings.
Proof. See the appendix.
As usual with CARA preferences, consumption is linear in net wealth (1 + rt)At ￿Mt but
is nonlinear in expected current period labour income. The latter is essentially an artifact of
the assumed within period timing where consumption has to be chosen before the employment
status of the current period is realised. In fact this labour income risk reduces consumption
for familiar reasons due to the risk aversion of the consumer. For current labour income this
works through the expected utility of current labour earnings, for future labour income risk it
works through the concavity of Et￿t+1 in labour incomes.
Remark 5 When it is optimal to re￿nance, there is maximum equity withdrawal (Mt+1 = ￿pt)
18and consumption increases
When it is optimal to re￿nance, the e⁄ect of equity withdrawal on current consumption is
unambiguously non-negative. However, with no re￿nancing, a shift in the current mortgage
state may increase or reduce consumption. It will have a negative e⁄ect on consumption when
￿t+1 < 0 and a positive one when ￿t+1 > 0 but the cost saving from increasing the current
mortgage Mt to pt does not cover the transaction cost of doing so.
Remark 6 Current mortgage rates in￿uence consumption through ￿t+1: a fall in the mortgage
rate encourages re￿nance which raises consumption.
The current mortgage interest rate only has e⁄ects via ￿t+1. When ￿t+1 > 0 and pt > Mt
there is scope for increasing the mortgage so long as the interest gain covers the transaction
cost. A fall in the current mortgage rate increases the chance of re￿nancing and therefore may
cause a switch from no re￿nancing of the current mortgage to re￿nancing to the maximum
extent possible, which causes a jump in consumption. Only a part of the current wealth change
arising from remortgaging is consumed in the current period (the coe¢ cient ￿), while the other
part of the wealth change is used to smooth future consumption.
Remark 7 The current savings interest rate has income e⁄ects on consumption, the e⁄ects of
future interest rates on savings are complex.
The current saving interest rate has obvious income e⁄ects on consumption. First, there is
a consumption increasing e⁄ect through raising capital income when the consumer has positive
￿nancial assets, but a decreasing e⁄ect through raising the debt service cost when assets are
negative. Future savings rates and especially that of the next period have much more complex
e⁄ects: directly through altering the slope of the consumption function in most variables,
indirectly through varying ￿t+1 and a⁄ecting the discounting terms in Et￿t+1: If at t the
foreseen rt+s increases (s > 0) all the terms in ￿￿ for t ￿ ￿ < s increase. In particular if s = 1
then ￿t+1 is una⁄ected and 1=(1 + ￿t+1(1 + rt+1)) falls, so that the marginal propensity to
consume out of labour income expected for this period decreases.
Remark 8 An increase in risk aversion reduces the variability of consumption over time.
As the degree of risk aversion rises, the absolute value of the intercept of the consump-
tion function falls in any period and so between any two periods there is less variability in
consumption. In particular there are smaller jumps in consumption when re￿nancing occurs.
196 Liquidity constraints
We have assumed that there are no restrictions on borrowing in a one period ￿nancial asset;
the only constraint is that debt must be cleared prior to death. As long as the lifetime budget
constraint is respected, consumers can borrow as much as they wish. This assumption is
important in making the key determinant of the re￿nancing decision the relative interest rate
advantages of borrowing against the house or against future wealth (including future labour
earnings and the future value of the house). Another e⁄ect is that despite the risk averse
preferences, the special implication of CARA is that optimal ￿nancial policy is essentially bang-
bang, using only either mortgage or bank ￿nance as debt both to smooth shocks and ￿nance
the house. Empirically this is far-fetched because, according to the Family Resources Survey, in
2004 12% of British households held no savings and any unsecured debt was con￿ned to credit
card debt. What are the implications of assuming that At ￿ 0 is a market constraint? The
re￿nancing decision becomes much less transparent since it has to take account of the fact that
remortgaging now in￿ uences the chance with which in the next period the consumer may end
up being liquidity constrained, e.g. if she loses her job. The multiperiod decision tree increases
hugely in complexity since then at any period current decisions in￿ uence the probability that
in the next and further future periods it will be optimal to be credit constrained with At = 0:
Even to solve for the optimal policy in this framework, let alone estimate parameters, numerical
solution is necessary. And if that is the case then why use CARA or CRRA preferences? It
would make more sense to use more ￿ exible preferences allowing for a clear distinction between
risk aversion and intertemporal substitution for example. What we can do however is highlight
the new types of optimal solution phase that can arise by retaining our model assumptions but
looking at just a three period example. The result is that when it is optimal to set At = 0 it
may be optimal to have a positive level of mortgage ￿nance below the maximum possible or
even the maximum mortgage ￿nance possible even if the mortgage rate is high. On the other
hand when optimally At > 0 it is optimal to minimise on mortgage ￿nance if the mortgage
rate is higher than the interest rate.
To illustrate these e⁄ects, we take a special case of our framework in which the there is no
re￿nancing transaction cost (k = 0), ￿ = 1, there is no unemployment risk (there is a certain
wage at T ￿1 and certain bene￿t income at T) and the mortgage interest rate ￿ is always above
the one period ￿nancial asset rate r, which is a reasonable assumption in this case because r
20is now the saving rate. First consider the last two periods T and T ￿1: In the ￿nal period the
individual consumes any savings held at the period start, cash in the house and repays any
outstanding mortgage debt and receives social security bene￿t so utility is given by
u(cT) = exp(￿b[pT + wT])exp(￿b((1 + rT)AT ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT))
At period T ￿ 1 the value function is then
VT￿1 = 1 + ￿ ￿ ZT￿1 exp(￿b(MT ￿ AT))
￿￿exp(￿b((1 + rT)AT ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT))XT￿1E exp(￿b[pT + wT])
where ZT￿1 = exp(￿b[(1 + rT￿1)AT￿1 + wT￿1 ￿ (1 + ￿T￿1)MT￿1];XT￿1
= E exp(￿b[pT + wT])
The T ￿ 1 decision variables are AT;MT and the constraints are AT ￿ 0;MT￿1 ￿ MT ￿
pT￿1: The derivatives @VT￿1=@AT;@VT￿1=@MT evaluated at particular points are critical in
determining the optimal decisions at T ￿ 1: These derivatives are
@VT￿1=@AT = ￿ZT￿1 exp(￿b(MT ￿ AT) + ￿XT￿1(1 + rT)exp(￿b((1 + rT)AT ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT))
@VT￿1=@MT = ZT￿1 exp(￿b(MT ￿ AT)) ￿ ￿XT￿1(1 + ￿T)exp(￿b((1 + rT)AT ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT))
At any time t the individual can optimally choose to be in one of four states according to
the values of the derivatives above (see appendix):
(1) At > 0;Mt = Mt￿1
(2) At = 0;Mt = Mt￿1
(3) At = 0;Mt￿1 < Mt < pt￿1
(4) At = 0;Mt = pt￿1
The values of ZT￿1 and XT￿1 in relation to the current mortgage size, house value and the
two interest rates are critical in determining the optimal regime for the individual. ZT￿1 re￿ ects
the utility from consuming period T ￿1 disposable resources, XT￿1 re￿ ects the expected utility
from consuming period T real disposable resources. Figure (3)below shows how the parameters
control the optimal choices at T ￿ 1: If ZT￿1=XT￿1 is su¢ ciently high the individual is credit











Figure 3: Optimal regimes in the presence of liquidity constraints.
individual does not re￿nance the mortgage but keeps it at its minimum level and also saves.
Between these extremes the relation between the current house value and mortgage and the
relation between the two interest rates determine whether the individual re￿nances with an
increased mortgage but at a level below the maximum obtainable.
The value function at T ￿ 1 is (with ￿￿ = 1 + ￿ and R = 1 + r) takes four possible values:
1. If exp(￿b(RT￿1AT￿1 ￿ ￿￿
T￿1MT￿1)) > XT￿1￿￿￿
T exp(b(wT￿1 + (1 + ￿￿
T)pT￿1))
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T)pT￿1)) > exp(￿b(RT￿1AT￿1 ￿ ￿￿
T￿1MT￿1))
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TXT￿1￿exp(b(wT￿1 + (1 + ￿￿
T)MT￿1) > exp(￿b(RT￿1AT￿1 ￿ ￿￿
T￿1MT￿1))
> RTXT￿1￿exp(b(wT￿1 + (1 + ￿￿
T)MT￿1))
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At T ￿ 2 the decision variables are MT￿1;AT￿1 which are selected to maximise u(cT￿2) +
￿ET￿2VT￿1: VT￿1 is a piecewise continuous function with four regimes or branches V i
T￿1, the
probability of being in each branch i at T ￿ 1 depends on the choices made at T ￿ 2: So we
can write
EVT￿1 = ￿i Pr(ijMT￿1;AT￿1)E(V i
T￿1j branch i occurs)
For example for the ￿rst branch
Pr(i = 1jMT￿1;AT￿1)








and similarly for the other branches. This demonstrates the way in which the complexity of
the current decision increases with the liquidity constraints. At T ￿ 2 the choices of MT￿1
and AT￿1 will involve trade-o⁄s between marginal value changes at T ￿ 2 and the expected
marginal value changes at T ￿ 1 over the four branches, as well as shifts in the chances that
each branch occurs at T ￿1:Given the strictly concave within period utility used, the marginal
values are nonlinear in the decision variables and analytical solution is not possible.
To summarise adding liquidity constraints means that explicit solution of the lifetime prob-
lem requires simulation and calibration and hence the generality of a full analytic solution is
lost. Nevertheless we can see that we would expect some individuals to be independent of
23￿nancial markets (M = A = 0); others to be savers with no or a minimal mortgage and yet
others to not save and have either a maximum mortgage or a mortgage but at a lower level
than the maximum attainable.
7 Other extensions
Our approach suggests some obvious areas for future research and has various special assump-
tions whose force we try to evaluate in this section.
First, generally the amount that can be borrowed on a mortgage is limited not only by
the house value but also by the current income level. The rationale for this constraint seems
to be on debt service cost grounds. For example in the UK the mortgage cannot usually
exceed three or four times the income. However, to incorporate the income constraint into the
analytical framework would raise nothing new conceptually and it would make the algebra
more complicated. Given that the individual wishes to re￿nance in period t; the new mortgage
decision would be7
Mt+1 = min(pt;￿wt￿1) if ￿t > 0
Again it is optimal to remortgage only if there is a ￿nancial advantage:
min(pt;￿wt￿1)max(￿t;0) ￿ k ￿ Mt￿t > 0
By substituting this condition into the value function, we obtain the term in mortgage activity:
minfexp(￿b￿t￿tMt);expf￿b￿t(1 + rt+1)[max(￿t min(pt;￿wt￿1);0) ￿ k]ggWt=￿t








expf￿b￿t max[￿tMt;max(￿t min(pt;￿wt￿1);0) ￿ k]gWt=￿t
Then the time path of ￿ can be easily deduced by following the methods of section 5.1.
Another obvious extension would be to allow for more than one type of house, e.g. a large
expensive house with price pt and a small cheaper house with price ￿t, where both prices are
7Since the wage at t is unknown at the time of re￿nancing, the income constraint works on wt￿1.
24uncertain and ￿t < pt. Consumers could then trade down from large to small houses and vice
versa. In terms of housing decisions, at t there are three choices: retain the existing house and
mortgage, retain the existing house but re￿nance, change house and re￿nance. In this context
it makes sense to add a second transaction cost kh
t that is incurred when changing house (in
addition to the re￿nancing transaction cost). The e⁄ect is to add a third branch to the value
function and the overall value function is then the maximum over the three branches. If we keep
the other assumptions (especially that of no liquidity constraints), the re￿nancing decision will
have the same form, once any house purchase/sale has been decided. Again all uncertainty will
be channelled through ￿; the value function will have a similar structure and the recurrence
relation for ￿ (4) will become
￿t = [￿(E￿t+1)￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)]1=[1+￿t+1(1+rt+1)]
￿expf￿b￿t max[pt ￿ ￿t ￿ kh
t + ￿t max(￿t;0) ￿ k;
￿tMt;pt max(￿t;0) ￿ k]gWt=￿t
Furthermore, in the compulsory retirement case we could make the date of retirement
uncertain. This is similar to dropping the perfect foresight assumption on wages and has
signi￿cant e⁄ects (see Berlo⁄a and Simmons, 2003, and below).
The main special assumptions that we have made are:
￿ CARA preferences depending only on consumption and independent of housing or leisure
or socio-demographics.
A problem with CARA is that optimal consumption may turn out to be negative since
marginal utility is ￿nite at zero consumption. We could make the utility vary with
housing and leisure; in the context of a model with a single indivisible house type, the
former would add little, but the latter would be interesting and, although most of the
structure of the value function, the re￿nancing decision and consumption would remain
unchanged, there would be some additional preference e⁄ects (see Berlo⁄a and Simmons,
2003).
With general strictly concave preferences over just consumption u(ct); the re￿nancing
decision would have a stronger interaction with other sources of disposable wealth. The
25problem at t can be written as
Vt = maxu(ct) + EV ((1 + rt+1)At+1 ￿ (1 + ￿t+1)Mt+1)
or using the budget constraint with Zt = (1 + rt)At ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt + ws
t ￿ k
maxu(ct) + EV ((1 + rt+1)(Zt ￿ ct) + (1 + rt+1)Mt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿t+1)Mt+1)
If ct is set at its optimal level from the envelope theorem in ct the marginal value of Mt+1
is
@Vt=@Mt+1 = EV 0()(rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1)
With CARA this generates a corner solution in Mt+1 but with general preferences EV 0()
varies nonlinearly with Mt+1.
￿ Perfect foresight of unemployment bene￿t, wage and interest rates.
This is an important simpli￿cation with potentially large implications. If interest rates
are uncertain, the consumer has a real portfolio choice, not just a choice driven by the
asset with the highest return. We might then expect to get some diversi￿cation of the
portfolio depending on the covariance between the interest rates and the covariance be-
tween interest rates and house prices.
Uncertainty in the real wage when employed can readily be incorporated so long as it is
uncorrelated with house prices and with the chance of having a job. The value function,
the re￿nancing decision and consumption will have a similar functional structure where
the expected labour income term Wt becomes
Wt = aEt exp(￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)wt) + (1 ￿ a)exp(￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)
If there is correlation between house prices and wages it is more complex. Another
assumption we have made is that the real house price is stationary; we could relax this,
allowing for a random walk with drift, and get similar results.
￿ A chance of being jobless that is constant (and foreseen) through time.
It would be easy to allow the chance of unemployment to be time dependent - essentially
26it is just a notational change, the e⁄ect will be absorbed into Wt, so all the results will
carry through.
￿ Omission of the impact of the tax system.
The treatment of interest income and payments, capital gains on housing and of implicit
user services of owned housing di⁄ers between tax systems, so it is important to interpret
these variables as post-tax.
￿ A single one period ￿nancial asset with a perfect capital market.
The biggest omission is the role of voluntary or involuntary contributions to pension
schemes. Pension wealth can be de￿ned by either the value of accumulated contributions
to date or by the estimated pension income that will accrue at maturity. With the former
approach and using the Family Resources Survey, Warren et al. (2001) ￿nd that individual
median wealth was about £63k, which decomposed into median wealth of pensions £26k,
￿nancial wealth £1k and housing wealth £24k. The pension wealth divided into about
39% in state pensions, 53% in occupational pensions and only 8% in "discretionary"
pensions. This asset structure accords with that found by others where liquid or risky
￿nancial assets are an insigni￿cant proportion of individual wealth. Pension wealth is
clearly important and serves both to remove some e⁄ects of uncertain date of death and
to act as a bu⁄er against asset shocks, e.g. falling real house prices late in life.
A further factor is that in reality there are wedges between the savings rate and the bor-
rowing rate in bond type ￿nance. Including this would a⁄ect the re￿nancing decision.
8 Conclusions
This paper uses a framework that allows us to analytically solve for the value function and the
optimal lifecycle policies for consumption, saving in ￿nancial assets and mortgage debt when
a ￿nitely lived, risk averse individual faces employment risk and uncertainty of house prices.
This approach gives the advantage of being able to derive general propositions as opposed
to speci￿c simulation results without resorting to approximations which may have substantial
inaccuracy. The ￿nancial asset market is perfect and variable rate mortgages up to a fraction
of the value of the house are allowed. Using CARA preferences and the assumption that house
prices do not have stochastic trends while interest rates are certain and wages are foreseen
27facilitate explicit solution. However, the form of the value function and optimal policy that we
￿nd is generally robust to relaxation of these special assumptions, similar results would follow
if we had more constraints on available mortgages, uncertain wages, preferences depending not
only on consumption but also on housing services, more than one type of house. One main
result in all these cases is that there is a single "su¢ cient statistic" through which the e⁄ects
of uncertainty on the value function and the optimal policies are channelled. This is due to the
CARA form of preferences.
In terms of detail, we ￿nd that consumption is linear in wealth with an intercept that de-
pends on future employment and house price risk, and a slope that depends on risk aversion
and interest rates. The e⁄ects of housing wealth on consumption and saving/borrowing deci-
sions primarily work through the mortgage. Consequently, the analysis of the re￿nancing of
mortgages is important to understand how housing wealth can act as a bu⁄er stock against bad
shocks, e.g. in employment. We ￿nd that without liquidity constraints and with foreseeable
interest rates, the re￿nancing decision is driven by ￿nancial e¢ ciency considerations. The in-
dividual will re￿nance to the maximum extent possible in those periods in which the ￿nancial
gains from doing so cover the transaction cost. However, if liquidity constraints are binding,
then the individual might choose mortgage re￿nance even if the mortgage rate is high. Housing
wealth and mortgage ￿nance impact on consumption so that in periods when it is optimal to
re￿nance consumption jumps due to equity withdrawal. The ￿nancial gains from re￿nance are
used partly to ￿nance present and partly future consumption. Therefore, sometimes consump-
tion tracks cash on hand and is not fully smoothed. In other periods there is an ambiguous
e⁄ect of mortgage debt on consumption.
House price uncertainty may raise or reduce current consumption. On the one hand, the
opportunity of high house prices gives the chance of high equity withdrawal. On the other
hand, there is a risk that house prices might fall, constraining the re￿nancing possibilities,
which serves to depress consumption. The overall e⁄ect is ambiguous and depends on the
interest rate di⁄erential and house price expectations.
28A Appendix
A.1 Value function
At T all available wealth is consumed and no mortgage interest is paid since no new mortgage
debt is contracted so
0 = (1 + rt)AT + pT ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT ￿ cT + BT ￿ k
In the last period the value function is:
VT = 1 ￿ expf￿b[(1 + rT)AT ￿ (1 + ￿T)MT]gexp(￿bBT)exp[￿b(pT ￿ k)]
This result is obtained simply substituting the budget constraint at T into the instantaneous
CARA utility function. Hence, at T
￿T = 1
￿T = exp(￿bBT)exp[￿b(pT ￿ k)]
￿T = 1




fu(ct) + ￿EVt+1(At+1)jAt+1 = (1 + rt)At + Mt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt ￿ ct + ws
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f1 ￿ exp(￿bct) + ￿f￿t+1 ￿ Ef￿t+1 exp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)((1 + rt)At
+Mt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt ￿ ct + ws
t ￿ k) ￿ (1 + ￿t+1)Mt+1]ggg




￿t+1 exp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)ws
t]
￿
= E￿t+1 faexp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)wt] + (1 ￿ a)exp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt]g
The ￿rst order condition gives:
exp(￿bct) = [￿(E￿t+1)￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)]exp[b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)ct]exp(b￿t+1(1 + ￿t+1)Mt+1)
￿expf￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)[(1 + rt)At + Mt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt ￿ k]g
￿faexp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)wt] + (1 ￿ a)exp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt]g
that implies
exp(￿bct) = [￿(E￿t+1)￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)]expf￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)[(1 + rt)At ￿ (1 + ￿t)Mt]g
￿exp[b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)ct]exp(b￿t+1(1 + ￿t+1)Mt+1)
￿expf￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)[Mt+1 ￿ k]g
￿faexp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)wt] + (1 ￿ a)exp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt]g
Hence:
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+(1 ￿ a)exp[￿b￿t+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt]g1=[1+￿t+1(1+rt+1)]
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Therefore, conditional on the re￿nancing decision, taking expectations over the employment
status at t the value function with re￿nancing is
V R
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A.2 Et￿t+1









































The future EFs only include elements of the distribution of house prices for cases in which
their corresponding future ￿ is positive. Using this equation together with the expression for
￿t and the fact that
1
1 + ￿t+1(1 + rt+1)









A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The relevant ￿rst order conditions are
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32A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
There are 3 subcases to consider
A.4.1 Case 1
If ￿t+2 > 0 and ￿p




t+1 = exp[￿b￿t+1(￿t+2￿Ept+1 ￿ k)]
as opposed to
EFt+1 = E exp[￿b￿t+1 (￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k)]
From Jensen￿ s inequality it follows that EFt+1 = E exp(￿x) > exp(￿Ex) = EFc
t+1 since
exp(￿x) is convex.
cC ￿ cU =
1








where cC is consumption when future house prices are certain and cU is consumption under
uncertainty. Here whilst certain future house prices are going to allow mortgage re￿nancing for
sure, this may fail to be true with uncertain house prices. Therefore, house price uncertainty
raises precautionary savings.
A.4.2 Case 2
If ￿t+1 > 0 and Ept+1￿t+1 ￿ k > Mt+1￿t+1 then
EFc
t+1 = Fc





exp[￿b￿t+1 (￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k)]
￿ ￿





33Since ￿Ept+1￿t+1 ￿ k > Mt+1￿t+1 we know that
exp(￿b￿t+1￿t+2Mt+1) > exp[￿b￿t+1 (￿t+2￿Ept+1 ￿ k)]
However, E
n
exp[￿b￿t+1 (￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k)]
￿ ￿
￿￿pt+1 > Mt+1 + k
￿t+2
o
might be higher or lower than
exp[￿b￿t+1(￿t+2￿Ept+1 ￿ k)] depending on the nature of the house price distribution. Hence,
the overall comparison is ambiguous: there is a risk that future house prices might be low,
constraining the re￿nancing possibilities.
A.4.3 Case 3
On the other hand if ￿t+2 > 0 and ￿Ept+1￿t+2 ￿ k < Mt+1￿t+2 then
EFc
t+1 = Fc








exp[￿b￿t+1 (￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k)]
￿ ￿








exp[￿b￿t+1 (￿pt+1￿t+2 ￿ k)]
￿











cC ￿ cU =
1








A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The e⁄ects of labour income risk: for the current period suppose that income were certain at
the level wt = ￿wt + (1 ￿ ￿t)Bt: Then since the exponential is a convex function and ￿ > 0
￿exp[￿b￿t+1(1 + rt+1)wt] + (1 ￿ ￿)exp[￿b￿t+1(1 + rt+1)Bt]
< exp[￿b￿t+1(1 + rt+1)wt]
34and then since ln() is an increasing function, consumption is depressed by the labour income
uncertainty. For future labour income risk the relevant terms are in E￿t+1, Wt+s. If labour
income of some future period were certain at its mean level this would increase the term in
Wt+s which ceteris paribus would raise E￿t+1 and tend to raise current consumption.
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